Forensic intelligence can be described as a proactive process in which raw data are the traces, and the result is information that can help link crime scenes or persons of interest [1]. Traces found at crime scenes—from DNA and bullet casings to intricate documents—can be leveraged in two distinct ways. The first way involves forensic laboratory experts examining and comparing those traces with known samples to elucidate specific incidents, which aids the judicial process. The second approach is to compare those same pieces of evidence to others of the same nature, to see if there are connections that can be drawn between seemingly isolated criminal activities [2]. The role of intelligence analysts is to identify such patterns and offer early, actionable insights rather than conclusive evidence for courtroom proceedings.

Forensic intelligence can be viewed as having three main layers: tactical, operational, and strategic. These layers act as interconnected steps in understanding crime. Tactical intelligence provides immediate support for police officers as they navigate investigations. Operational intelligence is concerned with planning and prioritizing resources to curb crime rates, especially serial offenses. This aids personnel leading teams or overseeing specific regions. Finally, strategic intelligence aims to facilitate the understanding of criminal behaviors with a forward-looking mindset. This involves both tackling the problem and crafting long-term strategies. This intelligence is indispensable for top officials, and shapes both police actions and wider societal approaches [3, 4].

The Laboratoire de Sciences Judiciaries et de Médecine Légale (LSJML) is the only forensic laboratory of its kind in the province of Quebec. As part of this laboratory, our team had the privilege to be on the frontline of Canada's first venture into forensic intelligence. Building on our understanding of intelligence layers, we focused on a specific type of evidence: counterfeit identity documents (IDs). The manufacture and distribution of fake identification is a leading concern globally. These IDs grant access and invisibility and are a staple in organized crime and terrorist cell tool kits [5, 6]. In addition to financial fraud, these documents open doors to activities such as the purchasing of illegal weapons, acts of sexual exploitation, or renting vehicles to commit violent offenses. Diving deeper into the world of counterfeit IDs offers a clear picture of the vastweb of related criminal activities. The utility of systematic forensic profiling regarding these documents can therefore not be understated.

We drew inspiration from practices established in Switzerland [7] to shape a service fit for Quebec. Our process involves employing straightforward, non-invasive techniques to essentially unravel the forger's blueprint and establish the profile of each document. We use physical and optical methods based on infrared and ultraviolet lighting, stereomicroscopy, and visual comparison. When a new document is received, we engage in comprehensive profiling, which involves comparing the crafting technique of the document with that of similar documents, cross-referencing the image of the individual on the document with our extensive image database, and matching the personal and administrative details with stored records. If the details of one counterfeit document align closely with those of another, it suggests that the two documents may have been crafted using the same tools and techniques. When this is paired with data from ongoing investigations, a clear picture emerges; for example, shared characteristics may suggest a common manufacturer (e.g. a specific criminal group) or a shared origin in a particular forgery workshop [5]. Currently, our database contains more than 3 500 documents, most of which are IDs issued in Quebec. Of the documents we have profiled, 84% are likely to be associated with at least one other counterfeit document. This indicates that forgers often have their own signature techniques. A set of documents sharing these telltale traits is called a series.

When we first started to investigate the phenomenon surrounding counterfeit IDs, we realized it was (and still is) not recognized as an important public security issue. This is reflected in the lax penalties incurred for the use, distribution, and production of fake IDs [8, 9]. Although some entities play a crucial role in ID verification, they do not necessarily have the knowledge and tools to detect counterfeits [10, 11]. We believe that delivering training on how to detect fake IDs should be a central element in the response to these problems. Having a sizeable database allows us to delve deeply into the minds and methods of forgers. For example, we determined that certain forgers would produce different card profiles based on varying ID checks at different venues, which clarified why some individuals appeared across diverse series. Furthermore, some series initially appeared independent but were found to represent subtle shifts in a forger's technique. We have also decoded the security features that forgers can reproduce accurately and those that they cannot. This empowers us to offer training on how to efficiently detect counterfeit documents to our various partners, mainly police officers, notaries, and bankers. This could be thought of as a cycle; a fake document missed by our allies stays out there, which means it bypasses our database and ultimately reduces our insights into this Quebec-based criminal activity. To put things into perspective, we have dedicated ∼100 h every year for training and presentations, which has resulted in a significant increase in the number of expertise requests the LSJML has received. We have also introduced information sheets that are designed to highlight unusual trends, such as a novel manufacturing method or frequently spotted patterns. These sheets are shared with all Quebec police forces through the Quebec Criminal Intelligence Service and help to keep all parties on the same page.

It is sometimes complicated to combine forensic intelligence with criminal intelligence because of the limited information shared between police organizations and forensic laboratories [12]. To contribute to filling this void, we reached out to our primary source of counterfeit documents, the Laval Police Service, which is ranked as Quebec's third-largest municipal police force. This joint effort comprised two parts. Laval's criminal intelligence team provided detailed circumstantial information regarding seizures of fake IDs, and our team rendered forensic intelligence resulting from exhaustive document analysis. By blending these intelligence streams, we aimed to deepen our insights into the networks crafting and circulating fake IDs. We sifted through every file received from the Laval Police Service, pored over investigative notes, and drew on insights from their criminal intelligence analysts. This enriched perspective sharpened our understanding of the existing series, giving us a clear picture based on the document manufacturing methods. With the help of the Analyst's Notebook^® tool, we mapped the intricate relationships we uncovered, which gave the criminal intelligence analysts a fresh lens to look through. As a result, we were able to pinpoint key operatives in a counterfeit ID distribution ring. In addition to supplying drivers' licenses and health insurance cards (which belonged to two series we had previously identified in our database) to various mules operating throughout Quebec, this criminal network had alleged ties to street gangs and was participating in illegal cannabis dealings. Some mules were also spotted in images from counterfeit documents retrieved from computer equipment during the raid of a Montreal-based fake ID lab. Most of these mules were operating under multiple aliases, which underlined a trend we often encountered in Quebec; namely, the presence of persistent fraudsters who engaged in repeated deceptive activities. Their recurring actions emphasized the critical need and benefits of centralizing data in a specialized database such as ours.

Although our partnership with the Laval police has been groundbreaking in terms of results and process, it only hints at the possibilities if every entity we worked with systematically shared their counterfeit finds and if we deepened our ties with every Quebec criminal intelligence unit. This would allow us to achieve an unparalleled understanding. As it is well known that crime does not stop at borders, we also think that collaborating with other provinces or governmental institutions would be beneficial to all parties. Furthermore, we suggest that every organization that frequently encounters counterfeit documents should be trained to detect them. For example, a mandatory course in the Basic Training Programme aimed at police officer candidates should be implemented in Quebec. Given the increase in expertise requests that these prospects would bring, an appropriate allocation of resources, both human and financial, should be planned accordingly.

Overall, whether it is through relaying information between police organizations, delivering training sessions, or forging partnerships with criminal intelligence services, we have adopted strategies to be as proactive as possible. These strategies are aligned with the three intelligence levels highlighted earlier. Drawing this information together, our method of profiling counterfeit IDs is innovative, effective, and can bridge events quickly to reinforce ongoing investigations. Our partnership with the Laval Police Service has granted their analysts a new perspective. This collaboration exposed a counterfeit ID distribution chain and singled out an operational target within that network. By blending forensic intelligence with criminal insights, we shed light on a criminal faction that had been deeply rooted in the world of fraud for some time. We believe the results of this unified effort speak louder than words and underscore the sentiment “unity is strength”.

The authors would like to thank Caroline Mireault for implementing the project that led to the creation of the Forensic Intelligence Department at the LSJML. The authors would also like to thank Justine Barron-Marcil and the journal reviewers for taking the time and effort necessary to review this communication. Finally, a special thanks goes to Sebastien Novak for his help in editing and translating this manuscript.

Maralee Tapps and Romain Volery collected the data and participated in the design of this study. All authors drafted the manuscript, revised it critically for important intellectual content, and approved the final communication.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.

This study did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.