Acta Optica Sinica, Volume. 35, Issue 2, 227001(2015)
Optimal Solution of Phase-Remapping Attack
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Han Baoyuan, Kong Xiangjin. Optimal Solution of Phase-Remapping Attack[J]. Acta Optica Sinica, 2015, 35(2): 227001
Category: Quantum Optics
Received: Jul. 29, 2014
Accepted: --
Published Online: Jan. 19, 2015
The Author Email: Baoyuan Han (814630287@qq.com)